Historians hold different views on the attitude of the British government towards the Great Irish Famine of 1845-49. Radical Nationalists, like John Mitchel, often use the word 'genocide' to describe the policy of the British government towards Ireland during those years. Other historians, those who are more in favour of the British, try to justify the British Famine policy, claiming that the death of one-and-a-half million Irish people was inevitable. A third group of historians, among them Cormac O' Grada, consider neither of the two approaches as appropriate.
"I see it instead as the tragic outcome of three factors: an ecological accident that could not have been predicted, an ideology ill geared to saving lives and, of course, mass poverty." (O'Grada)
Nevertheless, all three approaches agree that the British government played an important role concerning the extent of the Famine in Ireland. This paper is going to examine that role, directing special attention to the attitudes of Charles Edward Trevelyan, treasury official in Westminster during the Famine period and mainly responsible for the government's relief policy.
Trevelyan's devotion to the current economic ideology of laissez-faire and his assumption that the Irish Famine was a divine intervention prevented him from reacting appropriately on the second failure of the potato crop in 1846 and caused a great number of deaths among the Irish population.
I am going to examine this in more detail by concentrating on the relief policy of the Whig government during the years 1846-49.
The relief policy of the British government concerning Ireland in the period 1846-49 is divided into three main stages: first, a policy of almost complete non-intervention, based on a relief scheme of the provision of public works; second, the establishment of soup kitchens, providing free food for the Irish peasants (Spring 1847 - Sep. 1847); third, complete reliance on the Poor Law system, using the poor rates paid by the Irish landlords to provide workhouse and later also outdoor relief (Sep. 1847- end 1849).
With regard to Trevelyan's personal attitudes towards religion and economy the first stage is probably the most important one - and Trevelyan's attitudes were by no means exceptional. The entire Whig party, and above all Lord John Russell, who became Prime Minister in June 1846, were deeply influenced by the economic theory of laissez-faire rejecting any kind of government intervention in the economic affairs of the country. Trade liberty was the main principle of their policy. Therefore, even after the complete failure of the potato crop in 1846 the treasury officials were more anxious to protect the interests of merchants and dealers than to face the threat of mass starvation among the Irish population. There are two main issues to be considered in this connection: first, the export of Irish food to England and the Continent; and second, the import of cheap food to Ireland.
Although, in August 1846, it was obvious that the potato crop would fail completely and Irish administrators begged Trevelyan to intervene and stop the export of grain from Ireland, Trevelyan refused to do so.
"'We beg of you not to countenance in any way the idea of prohibiting exportation. The discouragement and feeling of insecurity to the [grain] trade from such a proceeding would prevent its doing even any immediate good; and there cannot be a doubt that it would inflict a permanent injury on the country.'"
There are, however, several historians stating that, quite on the contrary, a temporary export embargo could have done a great deal of immediate good; it could have saved many people from death of starvation during the winter 1846/47.
"To have forbidden exports from the 1846 grain harvest might well have led to some reduction in food imports late in 1846 or early in 1847, but it would hardly have paralysed the trade, and it would have helped materially to fill the fateful gap in domestic food supplies until the Indian corn ordered from America began to reach Irish shores in December."
Although this is certainly true, one should not exaggerate the problem of continuous export of grain from Ireland throughout the Famine period. First of all, even if the grain had remained in Ireland, the labourers and cottiers - the poorest of the poor, those who actually died from starvation - would not have been able to purchase it because of their lack of cash. Secondly, as O'Grada points out, Ireland was indeed lowering its export rates to a great extent during the Famine years and increasing its import rates of grain at the same time.
"[…] trade data show […] that Ireland switched from substantial exporter to net importer of grain during the Famine years. […] Ireland, for decades a large-scale exporter of grain, imported massively during the Famine."
This brings us to the issue of import. In 1845 the Tory government under Sir Robert Peel had set up depots throughout Ireland to store Indian meal which had been purchased by the government in order to keep the local market prices under control. Under the Whig government this policy was continued, although to a much lesser extent.
"Government food depots should be set up only on the west coast, but not even there should they issue food while supplies could be purchased from dealers or obtained from other private sources."
The actual problem in autumn 1846, however, was that the stock of oat meal, even in that limited number of depots, was much too small to guarantee the control of the local market prices and to save people from starvation. When Trevelyan finally reacted in August 1846, one month after having received the first warnings of a complete failure of the potato crop, there was not enough Indian meal on the British and European markets anymore. Therefore, throughout the autumn 1846, the oatmeal stock in the depots was too small to open them for the starving people to purchase food. It was only at the end of December, when already millions of people were suffering from starvation, that the depots were thrown open. Several historians argue that if Trevelyan had reacted promptly on the first reports of the reappearance of the blight in July, the government could have imported enough Indian meal to open the depots a month earlier. Donnelly states, however, that 'this would not have been enough to avert the onset of famine and epidemic disease.' Nevertheless, it would at least have alleviated the consequences of the potato failure.
The export and import policy of the British government in 1846 demonstrates their absolute subordination to the principles of the free market and the theory of laissez-faire.
"During the Famine the belief that free markets would cure the shortages caused by the blight, and that public relief risked perpetuating the problem, were constantly aired."
Although nationalist historians tend to exaggerate the problem of export and import of food during the Famine period, it is certainly true that a prompt reaction of the British government and less devotion to the economic principle of laissez-faire but to the principle of humanitarian help would at least have alleviated starvation if not prevented a number of deaths.
As stated before, the Whig government during the period of July 1846 - spring 1847 almost completely relied on a relief system based on the provision of public works. Although the government extended and improved the public works system, mainly by putting it entirely under the control of the Board of Works, the system turned out to be completely inappropriate for the situation in Ireland. The wages were too low to enable people to buy food. Moreover, they were often paid with one or two weeks delay so that people had to starve for that time. Later in the tear 1846 and early 1847 the situation got even worse because many people were too weak to work fast enough to gain the whole amount of money. Therefore, the people actually most in need of relief were those who got least. Nevertheless, a huge number of Irish people, in 1847 about 700.000, were employed under the public works scheme. That was the only possibility they saw to do something against their miserable situation. Although most people probably knew that they would not gain enough money to purchase any amount of food, they at least had the feeling of doing something instead of just waiting for their death or for the workhouse, which was not much better. As Christine Kinealy points out, the policy of the British government turned out to be a matter of 'punishing poverty'.
"Throughout the Famine, the government remained opposed to giving free relief either in money or in food. Instead, it insisted that poor people should work on public works as a test of their destitution."
This is even truer when one is looking at the miserable conditions in the workhouses. People who had to enter the workhouse had to give up their entire former life: they had to surrender all their personal property, married couples were separated, children were separated from their parents, people were not even allowed to wear their own cloths. The government justified these measures by claiming that otherwise everybody would have wanted to enter the workhouse. Only the 'deserving' poor should get relief. This 'punishment of poverty' by the British government corresponds to Trevelyan's view of the Famine as a divine punishment for the Irish people's reliance on the potato as their single source of food. Therefore, non-intervention for him was not only justified by the ideology of laissez-faire but also by the notion that human beings are not allowed to intervene in the will of God. This was one of the reasons why Trevelyan, along with other British officials, regarded the Irish Famine rather as a benefit than a disaster for Ireland.
"The deep and inveterate root of social evil remains, and I hope I am not guilty of irreverence I thinking that, this being altogether beyond the powers of man, the cure has been applied by direct stroke of an all-wise providence in a manner as unexpected a unthought of as it is likely to be effectual. God grant that we may rightly perform our part and not turn into a curse what was intended for a blessing."
The Irish Famine, for Trevelyan, had three advantages: first, it would eliminate dependence on the potato; second, it would reduce the Irish population; third, it would teach the Irish people to control their own destiny.
To ensure the latter the government demanded that the Irish landlords paid for the public work scheme and for other relief measures. 'Irish property must pay for Irish poverty' was their slogan. The British government considered the Irish landlords to be mainly responsible for the bad conditions in Ireland because they were not able to manage their estates properly.
In spring 1847, however, the government abandoned the public work scheme and a network of soup kitchens was established throughout Ireland. Trevelyan finally realised that the Irish people were just too weak to work for their food. Furthermore, the soup kitchens were much more economical and everybody was guaranteed food. This measure, however, was of course introduced much too late. Many people had already died from starvation and disease. Furthermore, since the potato crop did not fail in 1847, Trevelyan abandoned the soup kitchens in September. But people in Ireland were still starving because most of them had not planted potatoes in the previous year. Despite this, from then on the British government entirely relied on the Poor Law system. Thousands of people ended up in workhouses, which were completely overcrowded. Therefore diseases were widespread and killed masses of Irish people.
All in all one has to state that the government's policy of non-intervention in 1846/47 at least deteriorated the situation of the Irish peasants. Immediate provision of free food for the starving poor would have prevented many deaths. Nevertheless, one has to take into consideration that the government officials regarded their laissez-faire policy as the only possible way to a better world. Therefore, it is certainly wrong to regard the Irish Famine as genocide. The government did not intend to wipe out the Irish people. What they did intend was a functioning economy, which would have made life easier for everybody. The results, however, were fatal and are unforgivable.
Bibliography
O'Grada, Cormac, Ireland Before and After the Famine: Explorations in Economic History, 1800-1925.1988.
